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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVATE EQUITY AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: SUMMARY OF THE 2007
ANNUAL MEETING REPORTS OF THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS ECONOMIC
ASSOCIATION
Summary
This Communication is a summary of the 2007 Annual Meeting Reports of the Royal Nether-
lands Economic Association. It draws a few policy conclusions in relation to private equity, hedge
funds and shareholder activism in the Netherlands. This richly varied collection of
the 2007 reports and columns of the Royal Netherlands Economic Association adequately reflects
the diversity of analyses and opinions on private equity, hedge funds and shareholder activism in
the Dutch society. How the balance in corporate governance will be restored is something that
cannot be determined precisely at this moment. However, the reports and columns in this collec-
tion contain many good and interesting recommendations that can serve as guidelines for acad-
emics and policymakers.
Key words: Private equity, hedge funds and shareholder activism
1 INTRODUCTION
In this Communication we try to summarise the 2007 Annual Meeting
Reports of the Royal Netherlands Economic Association (Koninklijke
Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde, KVS) and draw a few policy conclu-
sions in relation to private equity (PE), hedge funds (HF) and shareholder
activism in the Netherlands. We give our interpretation of the various reports,
and hope that in doing so we do not undermine the conclusions drawn by
the authors of the reports themselves too much. We leave the interpretation of
the stimulating columns by Henk Brouwer, Paul Koster, Lex Hoogduin, Ieke
van den Burg and Menno Tamminga, which often support the conclusions of
the reports, to the reader themselves. In our policy conclusions we follow the
sequence of the reports and concentrate on a number of themes, which we
believe constitute the real choices for policymakers. However, we have no pre-
tension that our policy conclusions will do complete justice to the wealth of
the reports and columns that make up this collection. We therefore encourage
the reader to read the entire collection; the quality of the various contribu-
tions justifies this.
96 DE ECONOMIST
2 THE BOOT & COOLS REPORT
In their report, Arnoud Boot and Kees Cools assert that the central
question today is how the function of public equity can be strengthened in the
Netherlands. Activist shareholders and private equity should in their view be
seen primarily as repair models and less as a long-term solution for the public
equity model. Activist shareholders (hedge funds) strengthen the public equity
model by accommodating its inherent weaknesses, such as lack of manage-
ment discipline and free-rider issues. Generally, Boot & Cools see shareholder
activism as a healthy development, which can prompt companies to engage
in a better dialogue with shareholders and other stakeholders. In addition
to benefits, however, it also brings drawbacks because the immediate actions
for which activist shareholders often call may be at odds with principles of
prudence and long-term value creation. Once shareholders become activists, a
company management has generally lost its credibility with the financial mar-
kets. A direct consequence is that this management has insufficient credibility
to obtain a mandate for a long-term strategy; management is then left with
its back to the wall and a long-term view becomes virtually impossible.
Private equity not only offers an alternative by removing companies from
the stock exchange via buyouts, but also gives shareholders information and
power, and consequently the ability to create focus and discipline. Here again,
however, there are a number of drawbacks. The actions of private equity play-
ers are usually temporary in nature because after a few years they begin look-
ing for an exit or sale. In addition, this model is also not without cost and
can also lead to perverse incentives. Private equity has a relatively short time
horizon and an almost exclusive focus on improving financial returns. For
both activist shareholders and private equity, Boot & Cools have formulated
a number of recommendations to compensate for these potential drawbacks.
These recommendations are greater transparency regarding the financial inter-
ests of the various stakeholders, better rules of conduct for the bidding pro-
cess, the ability to deal in shares and a clearer position and responsibility for
the Supervisory Board.
Boot & Cools also call for the direct strengthening of the public equity
model. They see two complementary and more direct solutions: strengthen-
ing the Supervisory Board and strengthening the stability of the shareholder
structure. This, they argue, should make it possible for the Supervisory Board
to gain a better grip on both management and shareholders, creating scope
for a better dialogue and more stable strategy. The combination of a Supervi-
sory Board that is too remote and inactivity on the part of widely dispersed
shareholders leads to inadequate supervision of the company in the formu-
lation and implementation of its strategy. The activist shareholder demands
more of the Supervisory Board, which must be more closely involved in the
day-to-day operations of the business, especially in relation to strategic issues
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and implementation of the main lines of policy. The more aggressive climate
in which listed companies now operate thus demands active involvement in
the strategy by the Supervisory Board, without sacrificing the Supervisory
Board’s independence with respect to management. To achieve this, Boot &
Cools recommend a drastic reduction in the average age of Supervisory Board
members and a greater diversity of membership, to enable them to fulfil their
new role more effectively, and even speak of a minor earthquake in the Dutch
corporate landscape.
Boot & Cools argue that one way of reinforcing the desired stability
among shareholders would be for companies to attract more stable minority
shareholders. Stock market listing can go hand in hand with having a num-
ber of minority shareholders in addition to a free float. The large amount of
money that is available for private equity could open the way, via new-style
venture capital companies—as a sort of ‘bank’ for shareholders’ equity—for
minority interests. This would offer greater stability for the company and its
strategy. The authors would also welcome the arrival of a ‘new’ private model
outside the stock market, based on financing by venture capital companies
through minority participating interests, akin to family businesses but with-
out the specific historical background that characterises such businesses.
3 THE FRIJNS & MAATMAN REPORT
Jean Frijns and Rene´ Maatman see a number of weaknesses in the private
equity governance system, which in their view require improvement. This
applies in particular for private equity, which is concerned with leverage buy-
outs (LBOs) of both listed and unlisted companies. In theory, such buyouts
are primarily a transaction between shareholders, in which the management
of the target company need not play a dominant role. In practice, the sit-
uation is different; in many cases, the management of the target company
is involved in the transaction at an early stage, because the acquiring party
has an interest in making a ‘friendly’ bid and because the management then
commits itself at an early stage to the success of the acquisition. The LBO
radically changes the strategic framework for the business and can therefore
have far-reaching consequences for other stakeholders such as minority share-
holders, employees, creditors and customers. According to Frijns & Maatman,
there is little point in trusting the incumbent management to make a careful
weighing of interests: the directors all too often have a vested interest in the
success of the acquisition. The question is how this imbalance can be rectified
and how the opposing forces can be marshalled in such a way as to ensure
that all interests are properly weighed.
Greater transparency in public bids is a first prerequisite. New regulations,
which among other things require that change of control clauses be made
public would be a step in the right direction. In addition, there could be
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greater accountability vis-a`-vis the employees of the party to be acquired.
Frijns & Maatman also see a bigger role for the Supervisory Board, for exam-
ple by demanding that certain management decisions should require Super-
visory Board approval, thus increasing the involvement of the Supervisory
Board at an early stage. Frijns & Maatman also see great merit in the intro-
duction of appraisal rights into Dutch legislation. They argue that this could
serve as a form of discipline for management and could have a corrective
function if management has neglected the interests of outside shareholders.
They recommend that employees be involved at an early stage in the sale of
‘their’ company. Greater interplay could perhaps increase the effectiveness of
the powers of works councils and trade unions.
More attention needs to be given not only to the acquisition process itself,
but above all to what happens after the acquisition. Frijns & Maatman cite
the example where private equity firms have adopted an aggressive approach
to the sale of business assets and to the relationship between shareholders’
equity and borrowed capital. This suggests that the internal controls may
need to be improved. Frijns & Maatman call for companies to be subjected to
more stringent ‘post-LBO’ requirements as regards transparency (accountabil-
ity) and supervision. They propose a study to ascertain whether the disclo-
sure requirements for listed companies could be extended so that they are also
effective ‘post-LBO’. They also recommend making it mandatory for acquired
companies to maintain a Supervisory Board with a majority of independent
members. An explicit part of the Supervisory Board’s task should be oversee-
ing the healthy financial structure of the portfolio undertaking.
Finally, Frijns & Maatman observe that the governance of private equity
firms or partnerships, and the management of the inherent principal-agent
problems, should be based less on structures and more on parallel interests
and reputation. The rise of megafunds, the introduction of Permanent Cap-
ital Vehicles (PCV) and private equity undertakings means that more atten-
tion needs to be given to structures with sufficient internal safeguards. In
their view, this is most likely to happen in private equity firms that focus on
institutional investors. According to Frijns & Maatman, these players would
accordingly do well to investigate whether they could take the management of
private equity into their own hands in order to head off potential conflicts of
interest.
4 THE PAAS, DE JONG, WOLTMEIJER & HAZENBOSCH REPORT
According to Paas, De Jong, Woltmeijer and Hazenbosch, there is an
imbalance between the interests of capital providers and the interests of
employees, whereas in their view such a balance is needed. This requires a
number of elements in the top structure of companies to change, particu-
larly in relation to the tasks, powers and appointment of the Supervisory
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Board. The business community is becoming more and more international,
and according to these authors this means that national regulation alone is
no longer adequate. Paas et al. accordingly argue that European regulation
of these aspects is needed.
In the view of the authors, employees have a direct interest in strategic
decisions taken by the company, because it is they who will undergo the
consequences of the company policy pursued. As a result, the interests of
employees should count just as much as those of shareholders. This goes fur-
ther than good social plans and even further than a proactive social policy.
Genuine employee participation, which results in the interests of all stake-
holders becoming an essential part of the weighing of interests, is of vital
importance. Current practice, in which employees are simply the object of the
strategic decisions that affect them, deviates widely from this envisaged situ-
ation. Paas et al. realise that the quest for a balance between the interests of
shareholders and the interests of employees is probably eternal. They concede
that their fundamental choice in favour of a social market economy already
embraces so many tensions that perpetuation of the negative situation is guar-
anteed. It is clear that the quest for balance raises more questions than it
answers. For example, how does the participation by the Dutch employees of
a multinational compare with the participation of others? And what do gov-
ernance regulations imply for the competitive position of the Netherlands as
a home for business? However, just because the field of private equity and
shareholder activism is full of pitfalls, this is in the view of the authors no
reason to avoid it; difficult fields can also be rendered productive. With this
in mind they argue that the plough must first be turned to our own field, in
our own country, based on the idea that a good example will bring its own
followers.
5 THE VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN REPORT
Arjen van Witteloostuijn argues that there is a paradox with hedge funds and
private equity. On the one hand, he asserts that the ‘stringent neoclassical
logic’, which dominates the economic sciences, leads to a suspicion that the
effects of modern expressions of shareholder activism, including those oper-
ating via activist hedge funds and private equity, are positive. Not only do
hedge funds and private equity generally generate healthy returns themselves,
they also make the target companies operate more efficiently and more effec-
tively. Hedge funds and private equity firms fail with some regularity, or else
their target companies do. In the author’s view, however, these are merely
the exceptions that prove the rule. The rise of modern shareholder activism
is a primarily positive phenomenon because of the preventive effect it has in
the business community as a whole. Van Witteloostuijn argues from the basis
of his organisational theory analysis of shareholder activism that there are
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also reasons for doubt. The short-term benefits of current shareholder activ-
ism may in his view possibly be overshadowed by the long-term costs due to
the unnatural profile and rhythm of the change that is imposed on the target
companies. Because the long term is generally beyond our view, however, he
argues that the word ‘possibly’ cannot be replaced by ‘certainly’, ‘never’ or a
conditional clause. Van Witteloostuijn also presents an organisational theory
analysis of the potential effects of hedge funds and private equity on the long-
term performance of target companies. He concedes that the evidence for
the suggested relationships is thin and usually at best indirect. His proposed
organisational theory analysis is accordingly above all a research agenda. On
the one hand he believes that the theory needs to be further refined; he
particularly stresses the need for a contingency perspective: under which
circumstances is it likely that the involvement of hedge funds and private
equity will have a negative, neutral or positive effect on the long-term per-
formance of the target companies? On the other hand, he argues that there
is also a need for empirical investigation; the absence of systematic empirical
research means there is still a lack of evidence for many of the suggested rela-
tionships.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The debate on the consequences of private equity and shareholder activism
will continue for some time to come. This richly varied collection of the 2007
reports and columns of the Royal Netherlands Economic Association ade-
quately reflects the diversity of analyses and opinions on private equity and
shareholder activism in our society. Precisely how the balance in corporate
governance will be restored is something that cannot be determined precisely
at this moment. However, the reports in this collection contain many good
and interesting recommendations that can serve as guidelines. We hope that
policymakers, politicians and scholars will take careful note of the analyses,
opinions and policy conclusions they contain, for the benefit of the Dutch
economy and society.
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